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INTRODUCTION
At its Ministerial Conference last November, the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") made modest advances of enormous
significance. The WTO began transforming itself from an
organization whose central value is efficiency to one that also
considers global distributive issues. This transformation is an integral
part of the next phase of globalization.

* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
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I advance this thesis with some caution; this thesis is built on an
admittedly slim reed, and on an acknowledged idiosyncratic read of
the Doha Ministerial Declaration' and the accompanying
agreements.2 The thesis probably does not reflect the understanding
of all who were present at Doha, and history could easily prove it
erroneous. It is hard to read the tea leaves of Doha with any
certainty. All we have are the words of Doha and the reactions to the
words, and we will not know whether the words mean what they
seem to mean until we see how the words are put into action. The
words may be misleading. WTO Members carefully selected the
words so that they would agree to launch a new round of
negotiations, and so that all Members could return home and claim
victory, accentuating their gains and minimizing their losses.
Ultimately, the words were driven by the imperative to get an
agreement and move forward. Moreover, interpreting the Doha
Declaration provides something of a Rorschach test; what we see
may depend on what we want to see. You may learn more from my

1. See Doha Ministerial Declaration (Nov. 14, 2001), WT/MIN(O I)/DEC/W/I

[hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration] (putting forth the results of the Doha
trade
negotiation
round),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/
english/thewtoe/ministe/min0 1_e/mindecle.htm.
2. See DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Nov.
14, 2001) [hereinafter TRIPS DECLARATION] (addressing the conflict between
pharmaceutical companies intellectual property rights and the necessity for access
to medications for public health), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewtoe/ministe/min0 le/mindecl_trips._e.htm;
DECISIONS
ON
IMPLEMENTATION RELATED ISSUES AND CONCERNS (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter
IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONS] (discussing developing nations challenges in
implementing
the
WTO
agreements),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min0 1_e/mindecl-implementation
e.htm; PROCEDURES FOR EXTENSIONS UNDER ARTICLE 27.4 OF THE SUBSIDIES
CODE (Nov. 20, 2001) (setting forth procedures extending the transition period
under Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures for
certain developing country Members), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewtoe/ministe/min0le/mindecl_scme.htm; DECISION ON WAIVER
FOR EU-ACP PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (Nov. 14, 2001) (allowing European
Union Member states to give each other preferential tariff treatments that are not
afforded to other WTO Members), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto e/minist_e/min0l_e/mindecl acpecagre-e.htm;
DECISION
ON
EU
TRANSITIONAL REGIME FOR BANANA IMPORTS (Nov. 14, 2001) (permitting EC
states to apply a separate tariff quota to bananas of ACP origin), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min0le/mindecl-ecbananase.ht
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analysis about my views on globalization than what the parties
thought they were doing at Doha.
Despite these caveats, this article makes and defends the claim
that, when we look back on the Doha Ministerial Conference several
years from now, we may well see Doha's significance is that it began
the transformation of the WTO from an institution preoccupied with
creating wealth to one that also considers the distribution of wealth.
We may see the beginnings of an organization concerned with
economic outcomes as well as with rules for markets, and we may
see an organization in which wealthy countries implicitly
acknowledge that global economic integration requires mechanisms
to redistribute wealth. The shift in emphasis I highlight is subtle and
incremental, and on the surface what happened at Doha does not
appear to be a radical departure from WTO practice. But if the seeds
of the distributive policies that were spread at Doha germinate, we
will someday mark Doha as the symbolic turning point in a
significant evolution of the WTO from a wealth creating
organization to one that also facilitates wealth distribution.
Although my thesis is ambitious, my analysis is grounded in a
traditional understanding of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade/World Trade Organization ("GATT/WTO") regime. In Part I
of this article, I set forth the general distinction between efficient and
non-efficient policies, and relate that distinction to the negotiation
agenda crafted at Doha-what is now called the Doha Development
Agenda. In this part, I seek to separate two aspects of the
Development Agenda-one covers policies to improve the efficiency
of the economies of developing countries; the other covers policies
that look toward the redistribution of resources from wealthy to poor
countries. This discussion sets the broad conceptual framework for
understanding the shift I see at Doha.
The analysis of this article revolves around several ways in which
the GATT/WTO system must strike a balance between various
institutional characteristics of the GATT/WTO regime if the system
is to remain stable and flourish. I take these characteristics up in Part
II of the article, where I outline three ambiguities about the
GATT/WTO system-the question of whether the WTO is about
rules or results, the ambiguity concerning the nature of the
reciprocity that feeds the WTO system, and the need for the WTO
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system to simultaneously champion certainty and flexibility. These
ambiguities form a kind of creative tension that underlies the WTO
regime-one that reflects the contractual nature of the WTO
system-and one that is constantly being balanced and rebalanced to
keep the regime intact and on course.
Part III of the article analyzes the Doha Declaration in the context
of these ambiguities and shows how Doha recalibrated the balance
reached during the Uruguay Round of negotiations. It makes the
claim that Doha emphasizes the results of the open trade regime
rather than just the rules, it introduces a more specific and more
equal notion of reciprocity, and it enhances the flexibility of the
system to accommodate specific situations. Part IV of the paper then
explains why this change in emphasis can be interpreted to provide
the nascent development of distributional values, and how it can be
understood as transforming the WTO from an organization that
emphasizes efficiency to one that also cares about distributive values.
The conclusion states why this is important and how the WTO might
incorporate a redistributive agenda more fully into its work.

I. EFFICIENCY AND DISTRIBUTIVE VALUES IN
PUBLIC POLICY
Public policy can be based on one of two broad values, or on a
mixture of both. It can be based on efficiency values-the creation of
wealth-or on non-efficiency values-values that have to do with
how the wealth is distributed and the impact of distribution on
people's lives. Or, public policy can be based on some mix of the
two. Because WTO Members are making global public policy when
they make international law, it is relevant to think how WTO law
implicates various efficiency and non-efficiency values.
Obviously-as the street demonstrators who accompany the WTO
and other international economic institutions remind us-the WTO
system has concerned itself primarily with values of efficiencyvalues of wealth creation rather than wealth distribution. The WTO
negotiators have been ingenious in finding ways to guide the world's
wealth producing machinery, but paid less attention to distributive
values those policies might implicate. The anti-WTO forces are
quick to exploit this fact. Putting aside the protectionist forces among
those who protest globalization, and abstracting from the protestor's
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specific arguments, their general message is that distributional and
other non-efficiency values matter.
The globalization debate is thus framed as a specific challenge to
the WTO-to what extent can an institution that dedicates itself to
efficiency values flourish without also incorporating non-efficiency
values into its policy mix? This is not an idle question, as a quick
reflection about national economic policy making shows. When
nations form their domestic economic policy they easily incorporate
both efficiency and non-efficiency values in their policy mix. They
often do this by making economic policy on the basis of efficiency
values only, but then using "tax and spend" policies to achieve
distributional goals. Both efficiency values and non-efficiency values
guide public policy, even if they may be confined to separate
spheres. Indeed, it is the presence of a mechanism for redistributing
wealth within a country that makes it possible for economic policy to
focus on efficiency considerations only. National economic policy in
antitrust or trade matters may focus on efficiency values and address
non-efficiency values through direct transfer and subsidy policies.
As this depiction of national policy making shows, the challenge
that I have identified for the WTO-that is, whether its singleminded focus on efficiency values is sustainable and will support the
long-rum stability of the free trade regime-forms a more general
question about globalization. We have no comprehensive
international mechanism for redistributing wealth.3 No good
3. See generally Report of the International Financial Institutions Advisory

Commission,
Allan H.
Meltzer, Chairman,
(2000),
available at
http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/meltzer.htm.
Some view the
International
MonetaryFund and the World Bank as institutions that redistribute resources.
Member countries, of course, subsidize the work of those institutions, which gives
them some claim to be redistributing wealth. However, the two institutions carry
out most of their work through loans, rather than grants. As a result, the monetary
subsidy to the recipient countries is exceedingly small. Only the work of the
International Finance Corporation of the World Bank Group, which gives grants,
not loans, is redistributive in the true sense of the term. Loans amount to
redistribution across time within a country, not redistribution between countries.
See id. Of course, loans that impoverished countries cannot repay involve a
negative redistribution, a distribution from today's poor to tomorrow's even
poorer. In this light, President Bush's decision to urge the World Bank to shift its
focus from a system of loans to a system of grants would be a real redistribution of
resources from wealthy to poor countries. See, e.g., Adam Lerrick & Allan H.
Meltzer, The World Bank Is Wrong to Oppose Grants, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2001,

1050

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[17:1045

institutional setting exists for successfully engaging in transnational
grants or subsidies that would balance efficiency values with nonefficiency values. We cannot balance efficient policies with policies
of transnational redistribution in an effective way. Thus the question
facing the WTO and the question facing globalization are similar-in
the absence of a mechanism for redistributing wealth, is globalization
sustainable?
WTO Members are conscious, of course, that the WTO is an
institution whose guiding value is efficiency, but many would argue
the WTO is not oblivious to non-efficiency values. By and large,
however, the free-trade dogma has skirted the issue of the role of
distributional values, and the possibility of giving distributional
values any independent force in WTO lawmaking, by asserting that
efficiency and distributional values go hand-in-hand. The implicit
free trade assumption, one embraced in WTO lawmaking, is that
only efficiency values matter in the setting of economic policy
because policies that enhance global efficiency will also lead to a
better distribution of wealth.4 The rising tide lifts all boats, and
economic liberalization benefits everyone, so policies that improve
the efficiency of the global economy naturally benefit all Members.
This is an essential part of the WTO story, for it portrays the
possibility that efficiency and distributional values are not at odds.
But what if that is not true? 5 What if efficient policies make it
harder for governments to reach distributional goals, and what if they
make some countries poorer rather than wealthier? Or what if
efficiency requires investment that poor countries are ill equipped to
make? How might the global trading community try to achieve its
efficiency goals without sacrificing distributional goals, which are
important to many people and to future support for free trade?
at A14. I comment on the role of international aid programs as a form of

distribution at the end of Section IV of this article.
4. See, e.g., Dan Ben-David & L. Alan Winters, WTO Special Study No. 5:
Trade,
Income
Disparity
and
Poverty,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres00_e/prl81_e.htm (last visited May 8,
2002).
5. See generally DANi RODRIK, THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MAKING OPENNESS WORK 25 (1999) ("[T]oday the
benefits of openness are oversold routinely in the policy-relevant literature of the
World Bank and the IMF.").
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Although I do not purport to answer these important questions in
this paper, they are real questions the global trading system must
address. The developing countries came to Doha with the claimreal or imagined-the deals made in the Uruguay Round left them
worse off, not better off-the burdens they undertook were greater
than anticipated, and the benefits of the deals they struck were less
than anticipated. 6 The system had to respond to these essentially
distributional claims. Although it was never explicit, the Doha
Conference proceeded with the silent assumption that not all
countries benefited from the Uruguay Round.
The response was the Doha Development Agenda. But we should
not assume from its name that the Doha Development Agenda has
distributional features. Instead, we must understand the difference
between policies seeking to advance development goals only by
improving the efficiency of the trading system and those seeking to
achieve non-efficiency values. Paragraph 2 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration states that "enhanced market access, balanced rules, and
well targeted, sustainable financed technical assistance and capacity
building programs have important roles to play."7 The first part of
the agenda-captured in the words "enhanced market access" and
"balanced rules"--is not particularly striking. It is the efficiency,
wealth creating part of the agenda. The WTO has been conscious of
the interests of developing country Members at least since the 1960s
and through preferential market access and generous transition
periods has taken many actions to make the WTO a comfortable
home for developing countries. Doha does not represent a
6. See, e.g., Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi, Keynote Address, The Evolving
Multilateral Trade System in the New Millennium, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
419, 422 ("[F]rom the side of the less developed countries, there have been even
more numerous complaints that the more advanced countries have not given them
the kind of access that they were supposed to be getting in exchange for the kind of
regime that they had to put up to get protection for intellectual property rights, for
example.").
7. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, para. 2.
8. See generally CONSTANTINE MICHALOPOULOS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN

THE WTO (2001) (discussing advice to developing countires in the context of the
WTO); BERNARD HOEKMAN & PATRICK MESSERLIN, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, REPORT ON HARNESSING TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH IN

THE MIDDLE EAST (2002) (recommending policy changes to Middle East and
North African Countries), available at http://ww%,w.cfr.org/public/MENA/pdf;
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fundamental shift simply by highlighting the WTO's concern for the
poorer countries. The insistence of the Ministerial Declaration that
"international trade can play a major role in the promotion of
economic development and the alleviation of poverty"9 is warmed
over broth indeed.
On the other hand, the call for "well-targeted sustainably financed
technical assistance" and "capacity-building programmes" is
explicitly distributional in emphasis." In this phrase, the Doha
negotiations accepted the notion that some countries face systematic
barriers to development, which make it difficult for them to take
advantage of the wealth producing aspects of the global trade regime,
and seemed to accept the notion that wealthy countries ought to pay
to help overcome those barriers. Although only a small step, this
premise creates the beginnings of an organization involved in
redistributing wealth, as well as increasing it.
In this article, I pull together this and other evidence from Doha to
show the sense in which the WTO seems to be moving from the
assumption that trade negotiations are necessarily a win-win situation
to one in which the Members understand they must sacrifice their
own short-term interests to make sure each Member comes out a
winner. I show the ways in which the WTO may be shifting
emphasis from efficient policies to policies to redistribute wealthpolicies where one country has to sacrifice its wealth in order to
ensure the wealth of another country. I show the evolving official
recognition given to claims of developing countries that their special

ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1987)

(discussing challenges of developing nations in GATT); DIANA TUSSLE, Til. LEss
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A CHALLENGE TO

THE GATT (1987) (analyzing the role of less developed nations in the GATT

system);

ABDULQAWI YUSOF, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE PREFERENCE.S FOR
DEVELOPING STATES: A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCES OF DEVELOPMENT NEEDS ON
THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1982) (asserting international law has

been shaped by the demands of developing countries); see also GATT, Trends in
International Trade (Haberler Report) (Oct. 1958) (putting forth GATT's original
study of the role of developing countries in the trading system); GATT, Trade
Policies for a Better Future, (Report of Eminent Persons on Problems Facing the
International Trading System) (1985) (reexamining the issue of the role of
developing countries in the trading system two decades after the Haberler Report).
9.

Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1,para 2.

10. See id.
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status as poor countries justifies that redistribution. And I show that
"fairness" in the distribution of wealth may now lead to an effort to
make sure that the benefits of any round of negotiations are more
widely spread.
I do not want to overstate my thesis-the WTO is still primarily
about generating new wealth, and the distributive policies I identify
can always be justified on the ground that without growth in all
markets, the growth of each market will suffer. But I believe Doha
can be interpreted to have sowed the seeds for a new kind of
institutional expectation at the WTO, one that takes distributional
values more seriously. I think we can see this if we understand the
ambiguities driving the WTO system, which appear to have been
recalibrated at Doha.

II. THE AMBIGUITIES OF THE GATT/WTO
SYSTEM
A series of unresolved ambiguities underlies the GATT/WTO
system and together provide the creative tension the system must
balance. These ambiguities are interrelated. The GATT/WTO system
is a system of rules, yet the outcome of the competitive struggle
between producers in different countries affects how the Members
view, and will react to and shape, the system in the future. The
system espouses reciprocity, without specifying the nature of the
reciprocity or what reciprocal results are expected from the system.
Furthermore, the GATT/WTO system embodies a mix of certainty
and flexibility, which reflects the ambiguity of a system that values
both rules and results while maintaining unspecified expectations
about the system's reciprocity. This section examines each of these
ambiguities.
Understanding these ambiguities and the difficulty of balancing
them is important to our understanding of the tensions underlying the
Doha Development Round. The ambiguities cannot be resolved
because they are inherent in the system, and Doha did not attempt to
resolve them. However, as I show in the next section of this article,
Doha can be interpreted as changing the balance in the values
represented by the ambiguities. As I argue there, after Doha, the
GATT/WTO system is more flexibile, focuses more upon results
than in the past, and freshly views the nature of the reciprocity that
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the system is trying to achieve. Understanding Doha in the context of
the ambiguities of the GATT/WTO system therefore provides
important perspectives that the terms of the Declaration do not
themselves reveal.
I refer to these ambiguities as inherent in the GATT/WTO system
because the system is essentially a large multilateral contract with an
interactive process of negotiation and renegotiation. It is a complex
relational contract;" the parties are unable to specify at the outset all
the terms of the contract, the parties do not know what changes will
affect their relationships over the course of time or what the true
motivations of the bargainers are (bounded rationality), and the lack
of specificity and constrained knowledge make it possible for one
party to act opportunistically after the Members have put the contract
in place, grasping the benefits of the bargain but not the bargain's
costs.12 As in any relational contract system, how parties fare in the

relationship-the outcomes of the contracts-matters to the future of
the relationship; when outcomes diverge from expectations the
system is under strain.' 3
In order to deal with opportunism, bounded rationality, and
changing circumstances, complex contractual systems normally build
in governance systems to deal with unanticipated results. They also
build in flexibility to allow one or both of the parties to adjust to new
situations and unforeseen circumstances. Such flexibility is important
because without it, the parties may never enter into the contract in
the first place. Yet too much flexibility in the contract system will
also reduce the number and value of bargains, and opportunistic uSC
11. See generally Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Unanswered
Questions,A Symposium in Honor of Ian. R. Macneil: Relational Contract Theory:
Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 877 (2000) (providing a good
introduction on relational contract theory). International law scholars understand
the relationship between relational contract theory and international law. See, e.g.,
Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Ttreaties: Observance and Breach, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 313, 331 (2001) (relating non-compliance with international
treaties to relational contract theory).
12.

See, e.g.,

CAPITALISM,

Oliver

FIRMS,

E. Williamson,

MARKETS,

THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CONTRACTING 64-67 (1985)

RELATIONAL

(highlighting the difficulties in relational contracts).
13. See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of
Incomplete Agreements and JudicialStrategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 272-73

(1992) (showing incentives to breach contracts when the terms are incomplete).
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of the flexibility of the contractual system will impair the benefits of
the bargain. When, as in the case of the GATT/WTO system, the
bargaining is over time and in repeat rounds, the relationships among
those doing the bargaining continually change, making it harder to
have a rule based system that is also flexible enough to accommodate
the changing circumstances and interests of the parties. Informal
norms of behavior developed over time hold such a system together.
These informal norms accommodate the needs of the system to rely
on rules at the same time the parties are renegotiating in the face of
changing circumstances.
The possibility that one or more of the negotiating parties will use
the flexibility of the system to engage in opportunistic behavior
complicates the creation of these norms. The difficulty of
distinguishing legitimate interests from strategic interests, bluffs
from honest interests, makes any contractual system like the
GATT/WTO system difficult to manage. What provides the
incentive to create the norms that give the rule-based system
flexibility without opportunism is the belief and expectation that the
system on the whole will make the bargaining parties better off. This,
in turn explains why expectations about the results of the system, and
not just the rules, matter in contractual relations.
We can see these general attributes of cooperative systems if we
examine the ambiguities of the GATTIWTO system in detail.
A. RULE-BASED VERSUS OUTCOME-BASED
The first ambiguity of the GATT/WTO system is whether it is a
rule-based or outcome-based system. One image of the WTO-the
rule-based image-is that the WTO is simply designed to let
Member countries set up rules for the global market, without any
particular interest in the effect of the rules on determining winners
and losers. This is the predominant image that the WTO itself
projects; the web site description of the organization proclaims, right
at the beginning, that: "[t]he WTO is a rules-based, Member-driven
organization-all decisions are made by the Member governments,
and the rules are the outcome of negotiations among Members."' 4

14. World
Trade
Organization,
What
Is
the
WTO?,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewtoe.htm (last visited May 9, 2002).

at
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The rule-based image is the common image of the WTO in external
descriptions as well.
The appeal of the rule-based image of the WTO is that it appears
to be procedural only-the WTO sets up the rules of the road but
does not pick winners and losers. The market chooses the winners
and losers-invisible hand guided by comparative advantage. This
has the advantage of being, or appearing to be, value-neutral. It has
the advantage of appearing to eschew inter-governmental decisions
about which producers (or which producing countries) will flourish
and which will not. The rule-based image of the WTO is supported
by the notion that free trade is a positive sum game-it makes
winners out of everyone. Because everyone gains when the "correct"
rules are set up to govern trade, all that is required for global
prosperity is that countries get the rules correct.
The rule-based image clearly guided the Uruguay Round of
negotiations. At the start of those negotiations, the chairman made a
proposal "to include, among other objectives of the negotiations, that
of redressing growing, [sic] disequilibria in world trade and of
achieving, in the spirit of the Preamble to the General Agreement, a
greater mutuality of interests."15 This was rejected as "incompatible
with the basic objectives and principles of GATT, the guarantor of
the open and non-discriminatory trading system."' 6 Although no one
denied the growing inequality, that problem "would need to be
tackled by the countries concerned by various policy means,
including macro-economic policy, exchange rates, structural reform
and trade policy."17 Significantly, consistent with that philosophy, the
Ministerial Declaration itself adopted the principle of "mutual
advantage and increased benefits to all participants" as an overriding
negotiating principle, but did not require that the benefits of the
negotiations be shared evenly. 8

15. Statement of the Chairman, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Punta Del Este, Uruguay, Sept. 20, 1986,
available at www'jus.uio.no/lm/wto.gatt.ministerial.declaration.uniguay.round.

1986/toc.html.
16. Id.

17. Id.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 37-39 (explaining that the Doha
negotiations started from a vastly different perspective than the Uruguay
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In other words, the negotiations were to concern themselves with
rules, not outcomes. They were not to address the problems of poor
countries except insofar as the appropriate rules for an "open and
non-discriminatory" trading system would help those countries. The
negotiations were not to address results; the market was to do that.
As important as the rule-based image is for the legitimacy of the
WTO, the dilemma of the rule-based image is that the Members of
the WTO are not interested in rules; they are interested in results.
They buy into the rules only because the rules promise pay-offs for
the Members. The rules determine how particular producers prosper
under the system, and the impact of the rules therefore matter. It is
difficult to focus only on rules and not on results. Perhaps the most
dramatic example of this was in the Bananas" dispute. On the
surface, the dispute was about one of the most important rules of the
system-the rule prohibiting discrimination on the basis of national
origin (the most favored nation rule). But there was no doubt in
anyone's mind that the dispute was really about which banana
producers would flourish and which would not. The dispute
settlement process was certainly applying a rule, but it was also
deciding the fate of thousands of people with a stake in the
decision-and of several countries whose prosperity depends on
banana trade. It is very difficult to separate a rule-based regime from
the outcome of the application of the rules."0
Although the ambivalence between rules and outcomes often
embroils the WTO in public relations difficulties, the problem is not
just one of public perceptions. Outcomes determine the allegiance
negotiations).
19. See GATT Appellate Body Report on European Community - Regime for
The Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (adopted Sept. 15, 1997),
available at www.worldtradelaw.net.
20. See American Frozen Foods Institute, International Trade Update, July
2001 (relaying the compromise reached between the European Community and the
United States), at http://www.affi.com/update-inttrade-july.pdf. Indeed, the severe
impact of the decision on countries whose economies depended on the banana
trade made it difficult for the European Communities to comply with the ruling.
Eventually, the parties could not settle on the basis of rules but settled on the basis
of a political compromise that accommodated-better than did the rules-the
interests of the countries most directly affected. That compromise required, and
resulted in, a waiver of the obligations that the rules had imposed on Europe in
order to allow the parties to implement a result-oriented solution.
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Members have to the WTO system. Countries join the system not for
the rules but because the rules promise results. Their continued good
faith participation in the system depends on the results they get or
feel they get from the system. Therefore, the GATT/WTO system
faces the challenge of managing the expectations of its Members
without managing trade. Managing expectations is important because
the WTO Members enter into agreements based on their expectations
that the agreements will have certain outcomes. They would not
enter into the agreements without having expectations, for they
expect to maximize the gains from the agreements and minimize the
costs of the agreements. And they appraise the effect of the
agreements based, in large part, on how reality compares with their
expectations. It is important that results bear some relationship to
expectations, because the willingness to enter into new negotiations
depends on whether a country can trust its expectations-and its trust
level is often informed by the country's past experience with its own
expectations. It is a separate question of how those expectations form
and what influences them, but it is clear the WTO Members manage
each other's expectations.
The interest of the Members in the outcomes of the competitive
struggle is not simply a theoretical matter.2 The Members of the
WTO, and sometimes the WTO itself, do in fact manage trade, not
rules. Although the WTO system tried to limit outcome-based
negotiations, side deals between countries sometimes supplant rules.
The relationship between the United States and Japan in the semiconductor industry in the 1980s was not rule-based, but outcomebased.22 The same was true in the steel industry in the 1970s.23 And
the United States is reportedly trying to organize a cartel of the

21. See generally, Michael K. Young, Lessons from The Battle Front: U.S.Japan Trade Wars and Their Impact on the Multilateral Trading System, 33 GEo.

WASH. L. REV. 753 (2001) (showing shift from interest in balanced concessions to
comparability of results).
22.

See

GATT

DISPUTE

PANEL

REPORT

ON

JAPAN-TRADE

IN

SEMICONDUCTORS, May 4, 1988, GATT BISD (35th Supp.) (1989) (invalidating
the Arrangement in Trade Concerning Semi-Conductor Products between Japan
and the United States).
23. See Consumer Union of the United States v. Kissinger, 506 F 2d. 136, cert.

denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975) (refusing to invalidate "voluntary" agreements
reducing steel exports from Japan).
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world's steel producing countries to deal with the current global
overcapacity in the steel industry.24 These and other examples are not
offered critically, but simply to recognize that, when the stakes are
high, the Members of the WTO move outside the rule based system
to manage trade. They act as if what matters is results, not rules.
Moreover, the WTO-while espousing a rule-based system-has
itself managed trade. In the textile sector, producers have divided up
markets to fit political needs, not to reflect rule-based allocations.25
In the agricultural sector, the toleration of exceptions to free trade
principles resulted in de facto managed trade. 26 Again, the point is
not to argue the pros and cons of the "rules" in the textile and
agricultural sectors, and we must recognize the efforts to restore the
regimes of agriculture and textile trade to rule-based regimes. But it
is worth noting, even within the rule-based system that the WTO has
set up, outcomes sometimes drive the rules, not vice-versa.
In short, the ambiguity between a rule-based system and an
outcome-based system is significant. The GATT/WTO system is a
system of rules to govern economic relations between countries, but
24. See The U.S. Won "t Take "No "for an Answer at Paris Steel Summit,

WALL

J., Dec. 14, 2001, at Al (discussing the current state of the steel industry, and
past and future efforts to control steel production). The meetings are being held
under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperatoin and
Development ("OECD") and periodic reports on the progress of the consultations
can be found on the OECD web site. See, e.g., Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, High Level Meeting on Steel, 18-19 April 2002
(documenting a high level meeting on steel on April 18-19, 2002), at
http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/0,,EN-document-0-nodirectorate-no- 12-286360,00.html (last visited May 9, 2002). Any agreements to limit production capacity
could easily be construed as violations of Article 11 of the Agreement on
Safeguards, which obligates WTO members not to "take or maintain any voluntary
export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements, or any other similar
mearsures...." Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 11 [hereinafter Agreement on
Safeguards], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/25-safeg.pdf.
25. See GATT Secretariat, Textiles and Clothing in the World EcononmY (1984),
excerpted in John H. Jackson & William J. Davey, Legal Problems of
hIternationalEconomic Relations 638-42 (West, 2d ed. 1986) (explaining that the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing seeks to reintegrate textile
and clothing products into the WTO over time).
26. See William J. Davey, The Rulesfor Agricultural Trade in GA TT, in GATT
AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE (M. Honma, A. Shimizu & H.
Funatsu eds., 1993).
ST.
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its stability depends on the ability of countries to meet their goals
through a system of rules. To sustain the system, the rules must
deliver results.
B. RECIPROCITY-EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES OR EQUAL BENEFITS

It is well acknowledged that the WTO negotiations demand
reciprocal benefits; 27 negotiations must provide a win-win situation.
But the principle of reciprocity is ambiguous. Does reciprocity mean,
for example, that every country must benefit, or that every country
must benefit equally? And if reciprocity demands that benefits be
equal, how should equality be measured? And does reciprocity mean
every country must benefit in terms of the expected outcomes of the
negotiations, or, instead, in terms of the actual outcome of the
negotiations? None of these attributes of reciprocity is well-specified
in the WTO negotiating context.28
By contrast, the concept of reciprocity is clear when a country
wants to avoid its obligations. When a country violates an obligation
and is unwilling to change its conduct, the country in violation of its
WTO obligation must provide the prevailing party with reciprocal,
compensatory benefits or the Dispute Settlement Understanding will
allow the prevailing party to take reciprocal retaliatory action."'
Similarly, when a country imposes safeguards, it must give
reciprocal compensation to the countries whose exports are
reduced.3" And when a country wants to increase a bound tariff, it
27. See PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 29

(1993) (discussing notions of fair trade and reciprocity, why they are sought
through GATT tariff negotiations, and the difficulties these goals present); see also
Young, supra note 21, at 762 (interpreting certain facets of the right to seek
reciprocal trade concessions).
28. See, e.g., Naboth van den Brock, Legal Persuasion,Political Realism. and
Legitimacy: The European Court's Recent Treatment of the Effect of WTO
Agreements in the EC Order, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 411 (2001) (arguing that
reciprocity should not be seen as central to the WTO system).
29. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of'
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 2, art. 22.2, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1227 (1994)
(articulating procedures for dealing with Members who fail to comply with
recommendations or rulings).
30. See GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
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must take reciprocal action to lower tariffs. 31 In all these cases, the
term reciprocal means "equal" or "equivalent" benefits, and the
dispute settlement process exists to determine what the equal
compensation is.
But the concept of reciprocity in trade negotiations is not so
clear.32 The reason, of course, is that no external monitor of the
negotiating process exists to determine whether the reciprocity
requirement has been met. No judge or tribunal sits outside the halls
in Geneva to rule on the validity of the agreements under the
reciprocity standard. The WTO Members have no reason to specify
the nature of the reciprocity requirement because it is not
enforceable, except in the context of the rules set up to govern the
negotiations and the conduct of the negotiations themselves.
Reciprocity in negotiations is not an external measure but an internal
one, determined not in the abstract but by the conduct of the Member
countries as they undertake the negotiations. The standard becomes
self-defining, and self-realized, through the negotiating process.
The nature of negotiating reciprocity that is actually employed by
the WTO system is not, however, an idle question. As I will show in
Part III, the issue of the type of reciprocity built into the
GATT/WTO relates closely to the nature of the fairness that
underlies the system. And the fairness question is never an easy one
to address.
Even if we were to specify that WTO Members should share the
benefits of an open trading system "equitably," we would have
difficulty specifying what that means. It surely would not mean that
A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. IX [hereinafter GATT]; see also
Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 24, art. 8. (guiding Members to maintain
equivalent levels of concessions and obligations when applying a safeguard).
31. See GATT art. XXVIII (providing for "negotiations on a reciprocal and
advantageous basis" when concessions are modified).
32. See generally RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAw 80
(1998) (explaining that these formulas are highly dependent on assumptions about
the responsiveness of trade to tariff changes and other factors, making the nature of
the reciprocity underlying tariff negotiations depend on the precise formula chosen
and the validity of the assumptions for which the formula calls); Sam Laird &
Alexander Yeats, Tariff-Cutting Formulas - And Coinplications,in THE URUGUAY
ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 89 (J.M.

Finger & Andrezej
generally).

Olechowski eds.,

1997) (discussing tariff negotiations
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the wealth of each country should increase by the same amount
following a negotiating round, for countries start off at much
different levels of wealth. It might mean that countries should
increase their wealth by equal percentages, but even that figure
would be difficult to ascertain.
The ambiguity of the concept of negotiating reciprocity is further
heightened by another factor-whether what is to be reciprocal is the
expected benefit of the bargain-the ex ante bargain-or the actual
benefit of the bargain-the ex post benefit of the bargain. This
ambiguity presents the problem of comparing ex ante expectations
with ex post results alluded to above, and is a formidable problem in
the trade realm indeed. Competitive outcomes depend on many
variables. Things change and unanticipated changes that no one
controls will influence the difference between expectations and
results. Although it often appears to be assumed that reciprocity
involves ex ante benefits, that assumption creates a source of tension
for the GATT/WTO system. As was pointed out above, it is results
that matter, so when countries measure their allegiance to the system
it must be ex post reciprocity that matters as well. So even a system
that sought to achieve ex ante equality of bargaining outcomes must
consider how to readjust the system in the light of experience if they
wanted expost equality as well.
Moreover, even if the system were to settle on ex ante equality as
a goal, determining ex ante equality is a gargantuan task, especially
when bargains are made across sectors. Even when countries are
exchanging promises to reduce tariffs-a relatively straightforward
determination-any negotiation depends on each country being
willing to make some broad assumptions about the effect of lower
tariffs on their exports. These assumptions include whether other
barriers will impede their exports, whether circumstances might
change the competitive balance between firms in various countries,
whether consumer tastes are indifferent between goods from various
countries, and whether consumer tastes might change. Negotiators
can overcome the problems associated with trying to bargain in light
of these assumptions only if they are willing to adopt some
simplified and stylized models of what influences trade flows.
Now that trade negotiations have expanded beyond tariffs to
internal processes for producing goods, the difficulty of measuring
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gains and losses from various obligations and trading across sectors

is magnified. How should a negotiator compare, for example, the
benefits of having greater access to the United States market in
textile and agricultural goods against the short term costs and slow

developing benefits of an intellectual property system to protect U.S.
patent owners? What does the concept of reciprocity mean when
WTO Members are trading these kinds of program packages?
C. CERTAINTY AND FLEXIBILITY

The third GATT/WTO ambiguity flows from the first two.

Because the system is ambiguous about whether it is interested in
rules or outcomes, and because it is ambiguous about whether the

benefits of the bargain must be evenly spread around, then it must
combine a reverence for certainty with an allegiance to flexibility.
And so it does. The GATT/WTO system is a living system, breathing

out and breathing in, combining rule-based certainty with rule-based
flexibility.
Virtually every WTO obligation is matched with at least one

exception, and ofttimes many. Tariffs are bound,33 but they may be
unbound for a price,3 4 and safeguards are available if imports
increase by too much.35 The TRIPs agreement establishes minimum

standards for national intellectual property regimes, 36 but it allows
countries to maintain exceptions, not only to properly balance the
interests of producers and consumers, 37 but also to meet national

33. See GATT art. II (binding tariffs through specific Schedules).
34. See id. art. XXVIII (allowing parties to modify the appropriate Schedule in
accordance with this article).
35. See id. art. XIX (permitting parties to take emergency action on imports of
particular products and describing the methods to do so); see generally Agreement
on Safeguards, supra note 24 (explaining the implementation procedures for
safeguards).
36. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement] (articulating the nature and scope
of obligations Members have to protect intellectual property rights in their
countries).
37. See id. art. 30 (permitting limited exceptions to patent rights that "do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not
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social priorities.38 GATT 1994 is filled with examples of "studied
ambiguity" that allow the system to have meaning that depends on
the context and changing circumstances.
One could expect no less from a system that is unsettled as to what
kind of reciprocity drives the system, one in which there is a tension
between rules and results. The flexibility is precisely because of the
need to adjust ex post results with ex ante expectations, and to make
sure that the rules give results that are reasonably acceptable to
Members given changing circumstances. As the U.S. delegate to the
GATT 1947 negotiations said with respect to the flexibility given by
the safeguards provisions, "[it] would give more flexibility to the
commitments undertaken ... [s]ome provision of this kind seems

necessary in order that countries will not find themselves in such a
rigid position that they could not deal with situations of an
emergency character."3 9 This flexibility is not obeisance to political
expediency. Rather, it is an essential ingredient in getting the
agreement in the first place.40 In the words of one noted trade
scholar, "flexibility in the process of reducing trade barriers...

unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner"); see also id.
art. 13 ("[C]onfin[ing] limitations or exceptions to measures that do not conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the right holder.").

38. See id. art. 8 (allowing Members to adopt "measures necessary to protect
public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital

importance to their socio-economic and technological development" if consistent
with the TRIPs Agreement). Exceptions like these present curious interpretive
tasks because of their circularity-an exception to the requirements must be

consistent with the Agreement, which authorizes the exception. This must mean
something other than that the measure must be consistent with the obligation, for

then there would be no need for an exception. But, it must mean something less
than carte blanche to avoid obligations. For one attempt to reconcile these
obligations and exceptions, see Markus Nolff, Compulsory Patent Licensing in
View of the WTO Ministerial Conference Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and PublicHealth, 84 J.PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 133, 136 (2002).
39. See U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.II/PV.7, at 3 (1946).
40. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionismas a "Safeguard:" A Positive
Analysis of the GA TT "Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. C1 ii.
L. REv. 255 (1991) (examining the benefits and implications of the "escape
clause" in GATT and arguing for its necessity in the Agreement).
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enhances the likelihood of agreement by accommodating the selfinterest of each Member."'"
In sum, the GATT/WTO system must exhibit flexibility within a
rule-based system because the outcomes of the competitive process
matter to WTO Members and because the outcomes must be
reciprocal in some sense for the WTO Members to have continued
faith in the overall benefits of the system. The GATT/WTO system
must therefore continually balance rules against results, certainty
against flexibility, and various kinds of reciprocity in order to give
Members an incentive to comply in good faith with the applicable
rules.

III. DOHA RECALIBRATES THE BALANCE
Doha did not resolve these ambiguities, which are essentially
irresolvable. It did, however, tip the balance in an apparently new
direction. Outcomes matter: Members must make sure that the
outcomes generated by the trading rules, and not the expected
outcomes of the negotiations, become a win-win situation. Flexibility
matters: the WTO system must be flexible enough to accommodate
unanticipated circumstances. And wealth matters: the poorer
countries have an implicit claim on the wealth created by the global
trading system to help them take advantage of the wealth-creating
opportunities of the rule-based system. This new balance is reflected
in several key characteristics of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.
A. NEGOTIATING AROUND BALANCED GAINS

If one were looking for a single phrase to symbolize the hope of
Doha it would be in the phrase "balanced outcomes." Paragraph 49
of the Declaration states that the negotiations ".. . shall be conducted
with a view to ensuring benefits to all participants and to achieving
an overall balance in the outcome of the negotiations."" - This phrase
alone distinguishes the Doha Development Round from the Uruguay

41.

RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 889 (1996).

42. See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1,para. 49 (emphasis added).
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Round. As we have seen, the concept of balanced outcomes was
explicitly rejected as a rule of negotiation prior to the Uruguay
Round,43 which opted instead for a principle of "mutual advantages
and increased benefits to all." How might we interpret this shift
from "mutual advantages" to "balanced outcomes?"4 4
Under one interpretation, the goal of "balanced outcomes" could
be only verbiage. It could therefore be an unrealistic guide for
understanding the Doha Development Agenda. And we must
acknowledge the numerous ways in which that goal can easily be
subverted. But let us put those notions aside for the moment,
returning to them later, in order to see how powerful the "balanced
outcomes" principle would be if it were implemented. Basically, the
principle imposes a standard of fairness on the outcome of the
negotiations that serves as a non-efficiency constraint on the
negotiators.
We can use a simple bilateral negotiating diagram to show the
power of that thought. 5 As illustration 1 (infra page 1068) shows, in
any two party negotiations, both parties (countries or individuals)
start off with a certain level of welfare and seek to negotiate deals
that will increase their welfare. Country A's welfare is measured on
the horizontal axis and Country B's welfare on the vertical axis. For
the purpose of this illustration we need not define welfare. In the
context of trade negotiations, it can be considered as national wealth,
or as some mix of wealth producing and social policies that make the

43. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
44. See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, para. 49 (requiring that
negotiations be conducted to ensure benefits AND a balanced outcome to all). The
declaration launching the Uruguay Round, like the Doha Declaration, endorses
benefits to all the participants; the declaration launching the Uruguay Round does

not, however, endorse a balanced outcome.
45. See BARNARD HOEKMAN & MICHEL KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO 62 (1995) (using a

simple bilateral negotiating diagram in the context of trade negotiations); see also
HOWARD RAIFFA, LECTURES ON NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS 23-25 (1996)
(demonstrating that basic two-party negotiating diagrams are essential to
understanding the bargaining process).
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country better off. 4 6 Indeed, we do not need to know what index of
welfare each party adopts since each party defines its welfare to fit
its situation and seeks to increase that welfare in the negotiations.
The position of the each of the parties before the negotiations start is
the status quo point, point x on illustration 1 (where A's welfare is al
and B's welfare is bl). As can be seen, both parties seek to increase
their welfare and therefore look for "deals" that are above and to the
right of the status quo point-which is the field of results that make
both parties better off.
Where the negotiations in fact end up is indeterminate, and, in one
sense, as long as each party gains from the negotiation, where any
party ends up is irrelevant. That is, if both parties are made better off,
the negotiations have succeeded. Even point y improves the welfare
of each country and makes the negotiations worthwhile (provided, of
course, that the increase in the welfare of the two countries exceeds
the cost of negotiations). The concept of efficiency imposes some
determinacy on the outcome of the negotiations, because we want the
parties to overcome the barriers to negotiation in a way that
maximizes the Pareto efficiency47 of the bargaining-that is, we want
them to bargain such that neither party could have a welfare gain
without the other party suffering a welfare loss. If we can make one
party better off without making the other party worse off, we should
do that, for the sum of their welfare then increases. In other words, if
the parties are at point y and could, given the resources available to
them, get to point z we should find a way to help them bargain to
point z.

46. The policy-makers and negotiators, of course, define the welfare for each
party, so public choice theory always impels us to add that the welfare may in fact
make the policy-makers or negotiators better off as well. But that public choice
perspective is also not relevant to the analysis of what bargaining looks like when
it is constrained by a notion of "balanced outcomes."
47. See generally

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW

14-15

(5th ed. 1998) (providing basic background discussion of Pareto efficiency);
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS

12 (2000).
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Illustration I

---- ---- -

--

al

Country A Welfare

But even the concept of Pareto-efficient bargaining does not yield
much of a criterion of determinacy, for the range of outcomes that
are Pareto efficient (in the sense that neither party can be made better
off without making the other party worse off) is large. Indeed, we
can define a range of outcomes, denoted on illustration I as pl, p 2 .
and p3, that are each Pareto efficient. This defines the Pareto
frontier-at each of these points resource restrictions keep us from
getting more welfare for one of the parties without reducing the
welfare of the other. The Pareto efficiency criterion gives us no basis
for preferring one of these outcomes to any other; no one of those
Pareto efficient points is superior to any other Pareto efficient point
on any ground of efficiency. If we end up at any Pareto point we
have as efficient an outcome as we can get, but we have no
efficiency reason for picking that efficient point over any other
efficient point. And the reason we end up at point pl or p3 does not
affect the efficiency of the outcome in Pareto terms.
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Notice that any of the Pareto efficient points corresponds to the
notion of mutual gains from the negotiations, fulfilling the simple
requirement that each party benefit from the negotiations (the simple
reciprocity requirement). But notice that the distribution of the
benefits differs greatly between the most efficient points. At pl,
country B has gained a great deal from the negotiations and country
A has gained little (relative to B). At point p3, A has gained much
and B little (relative to A). And notice that at point p2 both parties
have gained proportionately equally.
The concept of "balanced outcomes" is easy to see from this
illustration. That concept would impose a fairness criterion on the
negotiations that would rule out any Pareto efficient outcome that did
not make the two parties better off in roughly the same proportion. In
other words, it would impose a criterion that would rule points p]
and p3 as unacceptable in the negotiations and would confine the
negotiations to a range of outcomes denoted by the shaded area-that
range where any gain by one of the parties is roughly balanced by a
gain by the other party.
Several properties of this fairness (or "balance") criterion are
worth mentioning. First, the criterion could require the negotiations
to sacrifice efficiency for fairness. The parties might have to forego a
point that is Pareto efficient in order to meet the requirement of
"balance." For example, assuming that the party's bargain to point p2
(which is both Pareto optimal and "balanced") but that they have the
possibility of changing the outcomes and getting to point p4 (a new
Pareto optimum point). They would have to forgo that outcome
because it violates the fairness criterion (it is unbalanced in favor of
A) and would make the outcomes unbalanced. For much the same
reason, the "balanced" criterion makes the conclusion of the
negotiations harder to reach because it limits the range of choices
that the parties have. When the range of outcomes includes all Pareto
points, it is easier to get a deal and claim success. When we can only
find deals in the shaded area, the "success" of the negotiations (in
terms of reaching a deal) is more difficult to achieve.
These considerations suggest that the "balanced" criterion may
destabilize the negotiations because there is an imperative in the
negotiations to get a deal, and also an imperative for country A to
hold out for point p4. These factors could drive the negotiators to
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drop the notion of "balance" in favor of efficiency and expediency.
And this, in turn, illustrates the chief weakness of the "balanced
outcomes" objective. Without an external monitor to determine
whether the outcome is balanced, the Doha promise of balance may
melt away. If the balance criterion is to be maintained, the parties
themselves must maintain it.
My claim in the subsequent sections of this Part of the article is
that the Doha negotiations may be interpreted as having been set up
to enforce the criterion of balance. There, I show the ways in which,
at Doha, WTO Members subscribed to a negotiating plan that might
make balance self-enforcing. Before undertaking that discussion,
however, we should explore more generally the factors that may
compel the negotiators to keep the "balanced outcome" goal, even
when doing so makes it harder to reach an outcome and may require
one party to sacrifice some benefit so that the "balance" can be
maintained.
In this respect, two other properties of the "balanced" criterion are
worthy of notice. First, the "balanced outcome" criteria corresponds
to fundamental notions of fairness-notions of fairness that have
wide appeal because they are fairness ideals that people use to
govern their own behavior and to appraise the behavior of others."
Second, the fairness criterion highlighted also corresponds to a
notion of efficiency that is captured in the concept of Kaldor-l-licks
efficiency.49 Pareto efficiency is a weak criterion for appraising the
outcome of bargaining (or the desirability of policy changes) because
it yields so many equally desirable Pareto-efficient outcomes. To
address this indeterminacy, the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion
allows deals (or policy changes) that improve one party to such an
extent the benefits to that party outweigh the foregone benefits of (or
costs) to the other party-that is, the party that gains the most from
the deal or policy change could compensate the party that gains less

48. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS: APPLICATIONS AND
THEORY (1986) (providing an economic analysis of the fairness components of
economic policy).
49. See generally POSNER, supra note 47, at 14-15 (explaining the concept of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in the presence of externalities); COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 47, at 43-44 (explaining the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in public
policy changes).
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and still be better off than without the deal (or policy change)." In
the context of illustration 1, the point p5 is Kaldor-Hicks efficient as
compared to point p2 because the party that gains from the move to
p5 could take the gains from that move, compensate the other party,
and still be better off. That is, although point p2 is an equitable
division of the benefits, point p5 is Kaldor-Hicks efficient because
the gains to A from moving top5 outweigh the losses to B of moving
from p2. A could compensate B for B's losses and would still be
better off at pointp5 after making the compensation than A would be
atp2.
Indeed, in a sense point p4 is Kaldor-Hicks efficient compared to
p2, though it is not a "balanced" or fair outcome. It is Kaldor-Hicks
efficient because Country A could take the gains from moving to p4
and pay country B enough to restore the balance of benefits. A would
be better off than not making the deal and B would be better off-in
both an efficiency sense and (if A actually paid B enough to restore
the balance of the benefits) in a distributive sense. Because of the
distributive transfer payments, A would end up slightly to the left of
p4, and B would end up in the lower portion of the zone of balanced
outcomes (the shaded area).
In other words, the concept of fairness that is inherent in the
notion of "balanced outcomes" and the Kaldor-Hicks concept of
efficiency coincide in an important respect)' They both suggest that
parties should make a bargain if it can yield toone of the parties
benefits large enough to allow that party to compensate the other
party and still be better off. The two concepts differ, of course, in one
important respect. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion does not require actual

50. See id. at 14 (noting that Kaldor-Hicks is called Pareto superiority because
"[t]he winners could compensate the losers, whether or not they actually do").
51. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency has another property that is worthy of
consideration. It can be a wealth maximizing point as well as an efficiency point. If
the Pareto frontier-the range of points at which one party can be made better off
only by making the other party worse off-is a straight line, then any point on that
frontier yields total benefits (that is, total increases in welfare) that are equal to all
other points on the frontier. But if the frontier is bowed outward from the origin,
then both the fairness and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion yield greater wealth than
other points on the Pareto frontier. In that respect the fairness criterion and the
Kaldor-Hicks criterion maximize wealth in a way that Pareto efficiency cannot

achieve. See id.
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payment of compensation.12 Under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, it is
enough that the gains to the "winner" exceed the losses to the "nonwinner," for that signals an increase in total wealth. By contrast, the
fairness notion inherent in the word "balance" is not met unless the
"winning" party actually compensates the other party and restores
the fairness balance to the outcome of the bargaining. We can say
that the notion of balanced outcomes-or the notion of fairness-is
similar to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency when the transfer payments arc
actually made. Under this notion of balanced bargaining, we can
achieve both efficiency and fairness if, but only if, the transfer
payments are made.
This analytical framework shows us, of course, why the
economist's efficiency view of the trade regime differs in important
respects from the non-economist or from an economist with a
broader welfare perspective. The economist with only an efficiency
perspective wants to achieve Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, for that
maximizes wealth and therefore makes the world better off by the
efficiency criterion. Others want to see efficiency coupled with
fairness (in the sense of equal gains) and they insist that the actual
welfare of both parties increase-that is, the WTO Members actually
make transfer payments. They couple the efficiency criterion with a
distributive criterion-the parties should bargain to reach an efficient
result but should then transfer wealth (i.e., distribute the gains in
wealth) until the gains are balanced.5 3 The transfer payment becomes
a redistribution of wealth. In other words, if the term "balanced
outcomes" means what it appears to mean, the WTO system can
achieve both efficiency and fairness by becoming an institution that
facilitates the kind of redistributive transfer payments that make the
twin goals possible.
Implementing this ideal will not be easy. However, as I argue in
succeeding sections of Part IlI, the Doha Development Agenda
52. See id. at 14 (describing that under Kaldor-Hicks compensation does not
actually have to take place for a negotiation to be successful).
53. There may, of course, be costs in making the transfer payments. In the
absence of lump sum payments, the mechanism "taxing" the accumulated wealth
in the lump sum payments may have adverse incentive effects. And the payments
themselves may have adverse incentive effects on the country receiving the
payment. Each of those incentive effects has to be weighed in assessing the overall
welfare of the outcome of the negotiation.
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seems to be set up to reinforce the ability of the developing countries
to make sure that the WTO achieves balanced outcomes. For one
thing, several decisions of importance to developing countries were
made, even before the negotiations began-a reflection of a process
of renegotiating the Uruguay Round agreements (subsection B. 1).
Moreover, the negotiations are staggered to address some issues of
importance to developing countries early in the negotiations, giving
the developing countries leverage in the process (subsection B.2).
Finally, transfer payments made to support capacity building will
ensure that developing countries have a better chance of negotiating
toward balanced outcomes (subsection B.3). In other words, the
Doha agenda starts off with a built-in balanced agenda.
In the final part of the article, Part IV, I show how, taken together,
the Doha agenda can be seen as a slow transformation of the WTO
toward an institution that also embraces distributive values.
B. ENSURING BALANCE
A large part of the Doha Development Agenda is crafted to give
developing countries an assurance that the outcome of the
negotiations will be balanced in fact as well as in spirit. Decisions
reached at Doha extended beyond the decision of what to negotiate
about, which is the usual kind of decision made when WTO
Members decide to launch a new negotiating round. Instead,
decisions were made on issues relating to the substantive scope of
the obligations under existing WTO agreements, and these decisions
resulted in rollbacks of prior commitments and decisions of
substantive interpretation favorable to the developing countries. This
is an important advance in WTO practice because it signals a new
flexibility in thinking about how the effect of prior negotiations will
influence future bargaining rounds. Moreover, even when the
Members could not decide an issue, and merely framed the issue for
further discussion and resolution, the Doha Development Agenda
puts some subject matter on a "fast track," and gives developing
countries some leverage, by assuring them that the resolution of
those issues will be known before the other parts of the negotiations
are completed. These techniques seem to be designed to keep a sense
of balance in the negotiations.
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1. Concessions to Start Negotiations-Rollbacks and
Reinterpretations
The most significant procedural development at Doha was that
industrial countries made concessions to developing countries to get
the negotiations started. As shown in this subsection, the Doha
Declaration contains rollbacks of previous obligations and new
interpretations that, if not a rollback of prior expectations, are at least
clarifications that favor developing countries."' In essence, these
rollbacks and concessional interpretations55 restore, in a small way, a
kind of balance to the Uruguay Round negotiations some Members
thought had been missing. Several obligations developing countries
undertook following the Uruguay Round were extinguished. In other
decisions made at Doha, the industrial countries gave up the right to
seek interpretations that would favor their interests. Taken together,
these concessions amount to a small but significant renegotiation of
the Uruguay Round Agreements.
One can see this renegotiation going on especially clear with
respect to the Uruguay Round agreement on intellectual property,
TRIPs. The creation of intellectual property involves a carefil
balance between incentives and access, between producers and
54. See, e.g., infra note 59 and accompanying text (describing the extension of

t he transition period under TRIPs with respect to developing countries).
55. The legal status of the various Doha actions is an open question. Arguably,
those portions of the documents that speak to the obligations in the various WTO
treaties are Interpretations under Article IX of the WTO Agreement. They are not,
however, termed "Interpretations;" they are termed "Decision," or "Declaration,"
or even "Procedure." See supra note 2. Even if they are not technically binding
Interpretations, they can be construed to be "subsequent agreements between the
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or application of its provisions"
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed in Vienna, 23 May
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 ILM 679, that can be used in interpreting the WTO
treaty obligations. They can therefore be given legal effect in that way. In any
event, they are clearly intended as a statement of common understanding that will
guide the conduct of WTO Members and, in that sense, represent a real shift in our
understanding of the content of the Uruguay Round agreements.
Subsequent to Doha, the United States has refused suggestions to make more
formal the informal moratorium on bringing dispute settlement cases in those areas
where rollbacks and concessions have been given, although it has acknowledged
the informal moratorium. See WTO, TRIPs Council Regular Meeting, March 5-7,
2002,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news02_e/trips-reg_
020307_e.htm (last visited May 9, 2002).
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consumers. Incentives are necessary to overcome the appropriation
problem-the problem that investment in intangible assets can be so
easily appropriated as to take away the incentive to invest in those
assets. On the other hand, access is important to insure that the
intangible assets are widely available and returns given to intangible
assets are no greater than necessary to provide the appropriate
incentive. Accordingly, TRIPs requires WTO Member countries to
meet minimum standards of intellectual property protection, but it
also recognizes the special position of intellectual property in
development and contains several exceptions allowing countries to
balance incentives and access. Often, this search for balance between
incentives and access, and the related search for balance between
development and minimum standards, is reflected in language that is
general or indeterminate.56 Like so many of the WTO agreements,
TRIPs was an agreement waiting for refinement.
As soon as the Uruguay Round concluded, it became apparent that
the balance struck there might be inappropriate in light of developing
health crises in many countries involving HIV, malaria, and
tuberculosis. As a result, as soon as TRIPs was signed, a wide variety
of governmental and non-governmental organizations began a
prolonged debate and reconsideration of the role of intellectual
property in the context of national health policy." Doha became the
culminating event in that public debate and a substantial refinement
of the balance struck during the Uruguay Round with respect to
pharmaceutical products-and in some respects even more broadly
in the intellectual property area. It also enabled further
reconsideration in the future.

56. See J.H. Reichman, The TRIPs Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or
INT'L LAW 441,463-

Cooperation with Developing Countries, 32 CASE W. RES. J.

64 (2000) (pointing out the "wiggle room" inherent in TRIPs and arguing that the
interpretive gaps should be closed through negotiation rather than dispute
settlement).
57. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTITUTE, PATENT
PROTECTION AND ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS PHARMACEUTICALS IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA, A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/aboutORGANIZATION
(2000),

ip/en/index.html?wipocontent frame=/about-ip/en/studies/index.html (discussing
the history of the debate up until December 2000).
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In some respects, the TRIPs refinement was a rollback of preexisting obligations. Under TRIPs, the least-developed countries
were to take on the TRIPs obligations after an eleven-year transition
period, ending in 2006. A "least-developed country Member" could
obtain an extension only "upon a duly motivated request."58 This
provision made extensions available on a case-by-case basis, but
gave no guarantee that any extensions would be given and gave no
hint concerning the grounds for denying the extension. Under Doha,
that transition period is extended with respect to pharmaceutical
products for all least-developed countries an additional ten years,
until 2016, for the minimum requirements relating to patents and
trade secrets.5 9 No application is necessary. Obviously, the
expectations with respect to a reasonable transition period for leastdeveloped countries, at least with respect to pharmaceutical products,
and the process for granting those extensions, has been rolled back.
Moreover, the Doha interpretations clarified some of the
ambiguities in TRIPs. Under TRIPs, the moratorium on bringing
non-violation violations 6 was to last five years, 61 during which time
the Council for TRIPs was to make recommendations concerning
non-violation violations. Under TRIPs, as clarified at Doha, the
moratorium is to be continued until the Mexico City Ministerial
Conference in 2003, with the "agreement that the Members will not
initiate such complaints under the TRIPs agreement. '62 In other
words, the industrial countries formally gave up their right to claim
that the moratorium on non-violation violations was ineffective

58. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 36, art. 66(1).
59. See TRIPS DECLARATION, supra note 2, para. 7 (stating that in addition to
the ten-year grace period provided to least-developed countries regarding
pharmaceutical products, least-developed countries maintained the right to seek an
even longer transition period with respect to pharmaceutical products).
60. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1183, art. XXIII (1194)
(stating that a GATT Member is permitted to challenge the measures of another
Member that nullify or impair a bargain, even if the measure does not itself violate
an obligation).
61. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 36, art. 64 (setting the rules governing
dispute settlement under TRIPs).
62. IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONS, supra note 2, art 11.1.
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unless it was explicitly extended, and they gave up the right to seek
to have the moratorium extended.
Furthermore, the Doha TRIPs agenda adds potential new
exceptions to the TRIPs obligations, which TRIPs did not even
contemplate. For example, some Members were concerned that even
if TRIPs were interpreted to permit them to secure needed
pharmaceutical products by compulsory licensing, they could not
effectively take advantage of compulsory licensing provisions as
long as those licensees had to be located in their country. Some least
developed countries do not have the manufacturing capacity to make
generic versions of patented drugs. If those countries were not able to
secure their generic drugs from manufacturers who were located in
other countries, any right they had to address their health problems
through compulsory licensing would be illusory. In light of this
problem, the Doha Declaration directed the TRIPs Council to find a
way to allow countries with insufficient manufacturing capacity for
pharmaceuticals to take advantage of compulsory licensing
provisions to get access to drugs. 63 This effectively sets the course
for a new exception to the TRIPs minimum standards.
The compromises with respect to pharmaceuticals were often
expressed in terms of an interpretation of TRIPs. But realistically,
they were major rollbacks of prior expectations. The declaration,
"[e]ach Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are
granted,"' is, in fact, a substantial gloss on Article 31 of TRIPs and a
rollback to the substantial limitations Article 31 placed on
compulsory licenses.65 At the very minimum, it is an expression that
the developed countries will give up their right to argue that Article
31 puts limitations on the compulsory licensing process. Similarly,
63. See TRIPs DECLARATION, supra note 2, art. 6 (requiring that TRIPs solve
this problem by the end of 2002).
64. TRIPs DECLARATION, supra note 2, art. 5(b).
65. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 36, art. 31 (establishing the requirements
for "other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder). The requirements
include, among other things, the following: that the authorization shall be
considered on a case-by-case basis; that a license have been rejected by the patent
holder, except in cases of national emergency; decisions to authorize use are
subject to judicial review; and that supply be limited "predominantly" to the
domestic market. See id.
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the declaration, "[e]ach Member has the right to determine what
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstance of extreme
urgency, '' 66 amounts to a declaration that the ambiguous provisions
of Article 8 of TRIPs-allowing Members to protect the public
health in a manner that is consistent with the TRIPs requirementscarve out an exception to the TRIPs requirements. It effectively
promises that declarations of national emergency will be
unchallenged through the WTO dispute resolution system. 67
The concessionary interpretations and refinements at Doha were
not limited to intellectual property issues and pharmaceutical
products. Another contentious issue in recent years is the use of
antidumping proceedings, which are something of a protectionist
weapon of choice for many countries. Developing countries want to
more tightly control Members' use (and abuse) of antidumping
proceedings. Not only did the Members agree to "negotiations aimed
at clarifying and improving disciplines ' 68 on national antidumping
proceedings, but the Implementation Decisions refined our
understanding of the WTO rules governing antidumping
proceedings. For example, some Members are concerned about
instances in which a foreign country closed an antidumping
proceeding because it found insufficient evidence of an antidumping
violation but then immediately opens a new investigation. For these
Members, antidumping investigations have no finality. To address
this concern, the Members articulated an agreement that national
authorities will not open an antidumping investigation within a year
of a negative antidumping determination involving the same product
and country unless circumstances changed.69 It is difficult to escape

66. TRIPs

DECLARATION, supra note

2, art. 5(c).

67. See id. art. 5(d) ("The effect of the provisions in the TRIPs Agreement that
are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each
Member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge
. . ."). This effectively

leaves the application of Article

6 of the TRIPs

Agreement-which had originally stated that principle-unreviewable.
68. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, para. 28.
69. See IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONS, supra note 2, art. 7.1 ("[W]here an

investigation of the same product from the same Member resulted in a negative
finding within 365 days prior to the filing of the application and that, unless this
pre-initiation examination indicates that circumstances have changed, the
investigation shall not proceed.").
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the conclusion this is an effective amendment of the rules relating to
antidumping proceedings since it gives exporters more assurance the
trading system will be stable.
In other instances, the Implementation Decisions signal that new
certainty will be added to provisions that appeared only hortatory to
some. The obligation in the Antidumping Agreement that developed
countries consider the special circumstances of developing countries
when applying their antidumping proceeding" was reaffirmed to be
"mandatory," with the instruction to make this mandate operational
within twelve months.7 Furthermore, the provision requiring
antidumping proceedings to be terminated promptly7" is to be made
more predictable and objective within twelve months of the Doha
73
Ministerial.
The treatment of export subsidies given by developing countries
provides another example of the rollback of previously negotiated
rights. Under the Uruguay Round Agreements, some developing
countries 74 could keep their export subsidies for only an eight-year
transitional period, subject to an extension if the Committee on
Safeguards determined a justification for the extension. The
extension was apparently discretionary and without objective criteria
that would determine when the privilege of an extension had to be
given. At Doha, this changed. Under the new procedures, interested
70. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization [hereinafter Antidumping Agreement] (recognizing that
"special regard must be given by developed country Members to the special
situation
of
developing
country
Members"),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/19-adp.pdf.
71. See IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONS, supra note 2, art. 7.2 (acknowledging
that Article 15 of the Antidumping Agreement is mandatory, but indicating that
clarification of its application is necessary).
72. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 70, art. 5.8 (noting also that
immediate termination of investigations is required where dumping is "de

minimis").
73. See IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONS, supra note 2, art. 7.3 (instructing the
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices "to study this issue and draw up
recommendations within 12 months, with a view to ensuring the maximum
possible predictability and objectivity in the application of time frames").
74. See Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 24 (identifying the countries that
are exempt from the measures of Article 11, paragraph 2).
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countries have an opportunity to seek extensions, and they have them
as a matter of right-the Committee "shall grant extension to
calendar year 2003" 75-when certain requirements are met. This
effectively makes the extension a matter of right instead of a matter
of discretion. Moreover, the conditions upon which the extension is
to be granted are made objective, 76 further reducing the discretion to
deny the extensions.
Taken by themselves, these rollbacks and interpretive concessions
are not of great import or general significance. Given the challenges
faced by poor countries, some might even characterize them as
niggardly. The significance of the concessions is not in their
substance but in what they portend for the WTO system. The
concessions occurred at the beginning of the negotiating round-not
during the round-and they were given without any return
consideration to the industrial countries except the promise by
developing countries to continue the negotiating process. They
change the image of the WTO from that of a bicycle that must
always be moving forward, 7

to that of a unicycle that must

sometimes move backwards if it is to go forward. In a sense, they
were echoes from Uruguay, a symbolic concession by industrial
countries that more balance in the Uruguay Round agreements was

75. Procedures for Extensions Under Article 27.4 for Certain Developing
Country Members, Nov. 20, 2001, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures [hereinafter Extension Procedures], available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto e/ministe/min0 I-e/mindeclscm e.htm.
76. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 27.4
(stating that the Committee would ". . . determine whether an extension of this
[transition] period is justified, after examining all the relevant economic, financial
and development needs" of the country seeking the extension), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/24-scm.wpf,
see also
Extension
Procedures, supra note 75, at 2 (explaining that under the new procedures the
extension will be granted unless the trade involved exceeds a numerical threshold
or the country Gross National Income exceeds a numerical threshold).
77. See Robert B. Zoellick, The WTO and New Global Trade Negotiations:
What's at Stake, Address Before the Council on Foreign Relations (Oct. 30, 2001 )
(providing an example of the popular metaphor that the WTO is a bicycle that must
constantly be moving forward if it is not to fall over), available at
http://www.cfr.org/public/resource.cgi?pub!4149. "[T]he bicycle theory of trade is
again in force: [i]f the trade liberalization process does not move forward, it will,
like a bicycle, be pulled down by the political gravity of special interests." ld.
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needed in order to initiate the Doha Round. This tips the balance of
the WTO toward flexibility and recognition that outcome matters.
2. PhasedNegotiations-GuaranteeingEarly Benefits

Even when decisions were not made on issues of importance to
developing countries, an important characteristic of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration is the way the negotiations will be staggered
within the context of a single undertaking. As during the Uruguay
Round, all Members will be expected to accept all the agreements,
even though "agreements reached at an early stage [of the
negotiations] may be implemented on a provisional or a definitive
basis.178 But at Doha it is also contemplated that some parts of the
package will definitely be completed before the negotiations as a
whole are concluded. And the timing of the stages is such that a large
part of the agenda of the developing countries will be fully addressed
before the agenda of the developed countries is completely
discussed.79
As a result, developing countries will be able to understand what
benefits they are to get from at least some part of the Doha
Development Agenda that they put forth before they are asked to
agree on more difficult matters. They will know whether at least
some of the outcomes that will ensure balance are addressed-or at
least whether their interests are being taken into account. This early
decision mandate is reflected especially in the Implementation
Agenda.8" Whereas the general negotiations are scheduled to go on
until 2005, virtually all of the implementation issues are to be
resolved this year (2002), or, at the latest, by the Fifth Ministerial

78. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, para. 47 (providing an
exception for improvements and clarifications of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding). Balance is achieved in the negotiations by a provision that "[e]arly
agreements shall be taken into account in assessing the overall balance of the
negotiations." Id.
79. See id. paras. 45, 47 (explaining that negotiations on certain issues have a
deadline to conclude by May of 2003 while other negotiations must be completed
by January 1, 2005).
80. See id. (requiring that the Dispute Settlement Understanding negotiations
be complete by May 2003).
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Conference in Mexico City in 2003.81 For example, according to the
Implementation Decision, the Committee on Antidumping Practices
must determine within twelve months the time period over which
imports should be measured when a country is determining whether
they are de minimis in volume and should therefore be exempt from
an antidumping investigation.82 Similarly, the Committee on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures must complete its review of
countervailing duty procedures by July 31, 2002.83
Moreover, some of the issues to be resolved quickly are more than
just questions to be studied. Some of the issues also assume an
answer that will alter and refine the substantive obligations of the
Uruguay Round agreements. Take, for instance, the TRIPs provision
that "Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions
in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging
technology transfer to least developed country Members."84 This was
obviously of importance to developing countries, but they had little
means of enforcing the requirement, even though the requirement
was clearly mandatory. The Implementation decision goes beyond
merely confirming this. It also requires industrial countries to submit
detailed reports on the functioning in practice of the incentives
provided under that mandate.85 In other words, there is a commitment
to make the requirement that industrial countries provide incentives
for the transfer of technology more than just a formal commitment.
There is now a commitment on the part of industrial countries to
prove that the commitment has been fulfilled.
In short, the promise of the industrial countries to complete work
on a portion of the Doha Development Agenda in advance of
negotiations on other matters represents a way by which industrial

81. See id. para. 12 (explaining that committees must
implementation-related issues and concerns by the end of 2002).

report

on

82. See IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONS, supra note 2, para. 7.4 (stating that the
committee on anti-dumping practices muist submit proposed guidelines within 12
months).
83. See id. para. 10.3 (stating that the Committee on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures will complete a review of the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures).
84. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 36, § 66.2.
85. See IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONS, supra note 2, para. 11.2
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countries can signal their commitment to balanced outcomes and by

which the developing countries can determine
commitment to balanced outcomes will be fulfilled.

whether the

C. CAPACITY BUILDING AND BALANCED OUTCOMES

The Doha Declaration emphasizes capacity building and technical
cooperation as ".
core elements of the development dimension of
the multilateral trading system." 6 It backs that emphasis with a New
Strategy for WTO Technical Cooperation for Capacity Building,
Growth, and Integration. Indeed, capacity building and technical
cooperation were such a pervasive theme at Doha that Paragraph 41
of the Declaration lists eleven paragraphs in the Declaration where
"firm commitments on technical cooperation and capacity building"
are made.17 Not only is capacity building a central feature of the
Declaration, but it is also a specific part of much of the
Implementation agenda.88 And in a new year's press release
following Doha, Director General Moore announced both an increase
in the budget of the WTO to carry out this capacity building agenda,
and the establishment of the Doha trust fund-with a proposed initial
endowment of fifteen million Swiss francs-to make the
commitment of financial support a reality. 9
86. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note I, para. 38.
87. See id. para. 41 (citing paragraphs 16, 21, 24, 26. 27. 33, 38-40, 42, and 43
for the specific commitments established for technical cooperation and capacity
building).
88. The Implementation Decision endorses capacity building, for example,
with respect to both the implementation agenda for the Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS measures") and the Technical Barriers to Trade
("TBT measures"). See IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONS, supra note 2, para. 3.5
(explaining capacity building for SPS measures); id. para. 5.3 (explaining the
capacity building for the TBT measures). It also urges Members "to the extent
possible" to give financial and technical assistance to allow least developed
countries to respond to the new SPS measures and to the new TBT measures. See
id. paras. 3.6(i), 5.4(i). Finally, the Implementation Decision urges Members to
provide financial and technical assistance to least developed countries to help them
manage their own systems of SPS and TBT. See id. paras. 3.6(ii), 5.4(ii).
89. Press Release, WTO, Moore Pledges to Build on Doha Success in 2002
(Jan. 2, 2002), at http://www.wto.org./englishl/news..se/presO2-ejpr266_e.htm. In
fact, the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund was set up with intitial
pledges of more than 30 million Swiss francs (S18 million), twice the original goal.
See Press Release, WTO, Governments Pledge CHF 30 lillion to Doha
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The redistributive aspects of these commitments are unmistakable.
If the trust fund is successful it will result in a direct transfer from
rich to poor countries. Significantly, the industrial countries
recognize the need for capacity building. They recognize that
implementing the Uruguay Round agreements is expensive and the
expense should not rob the poorest countries of the resources needed
for other development investments. They recognize that bargaining is
not fair-and that outcomes will not be balanced-if a Member does
not have the human and institutional capacity to bargain effectively.
They recognize that this means that some Members need money to
create a larger and more technically trained staff. It is also significant
that the industrial countries did not say that the developing countries
must fund their capacity building out of the gains from trade. Absent
from this program is the notion that if a country just reduces barriers
to trade and adopts the institutional accoutrements of an industrial
country, their economy will grow. The industrial countries are
willing to contribute to the tab.
It is easy to be cynical about the capacity building promise. The
capacity building touches only two of the many needs of developing
countries-help in implementing obligations and help in building the
capacity to negotiate effectively and meaningfully.' It may be that
the money donated for capacity building is in fact used primarily to
spread the rhetoric of free trade rather than to fashion trade-related
development policies that actually promote growth. Much of the
capacity building will be in terms of technical advice, and even the
direct payments will primarily be used to facilitate the training. The
amount in the trust fund is not great in relation to the need. One
might argue that the capacity building initiative was the minimum
necessary to get the negotiations launched-a kind of goodwill
Development Agenda
Global Trust Fund (Mar.
II,
2002),
at
http://www.wto.org/englishnews-e/pres02-e/pr279-e.htm (last visited May 9.
2002).
90. See WTO, THE WTO, CAPACITY BUILDING, AND DEVELOPMENT...A
PROPOSAL (2001) (discussing technical assistance and cooperation with non-WTO
institutions and agencies), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
ministe/min0le/capbuilddev-e.pdf; see also USAID, UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES TO BUILD CAPACITY IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION

COUNTRIES (Oct. 2001) (summarizing the U.S. effort at capacity building in other
countries), available at http://www.asaid.gov/economic-growth/tradereport/
index.html (last visited May 9, 2002).
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gesture rather then a meaningful contribution to the Member
countries.
All of this is accurate. However, we can look at the capacity
building plank of Doha in a different way as well. It was both
consistent with the WTO barter model of exchanging interests and a
fundamental shift in that model. On the one hand, the role of capacity
building at Doha was no different from any other deal made at
Doha-an advantage for developing countries, which imposed a cost
on industrial countries. The industrial countries offered a carrot to
get the developing countries to agree to an agenda that is thought to
yield benefits for the industrial countries. Nevertheless, the exchange
was fundamentally different from the normal exchange in WTO
negotiations. Here the carrot was a financial carrot, not market
access. The inducement to agree took a new form. Rather than
offering more access in a particular sector, the industrial countries
offered in kind and financial rewards. The industrial countries did
not just agree to more market access to allow the developing
countries to earn the money to invest in capacity building. The
industrial countries are making a direct financial commitment. This
changes the coin of the realm used for facilitating negotiated
exchanges at the WTO from market access to direct financial
payments.
At a minimum, Doha represents a subtle shift in emphasis in the
ambiguities underling the GATT/WTO system, a shift to greater
flexibility in addressing the outcome of prior negotiating rounds, a
commitment to balanced outcomes, and a new form of exchange that
contains explicit redistribution of wealth to poor countries. Let me
now tie these themes together to show how we can understand these
shifts as part of incorporating redistributive values at the WTO.

IV. THE WTO AS A DISTRIBUTIVE
ORGANIZATION
None of the analysis in the preceding section necessarily
demonstrates the transformation of the WTO from an organization
grounded in efficiency values to one that also cares about distributive
values. Many will see the concessions by industrial countries simply
as pragmatic adjustments to the realities of the division between
developed and developing countries. In what way do the aspects of
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Doha I highlighted reflect more than a simple recalibration of the
ambiguities underlying the GATT/WTO system? Assuming that the
words of Doha are in fact transformed into action, in what way does
the change in emphasis that I have charted suggest that the WTO is
taking on distributive values?
The capacity building provisions are the clearest example of the
redistributive ideal at work. They represent an admission that
openness alone is not enough, and that rules for openness may not,
by themselves, be capable of generating economic gains. They
represent an admission that poverty can be a stumbling block to
taking advantage of the promises of the WTO system. And they
represent an acknowledgment that the decision-making autonomy of'
individual Members is crucial to the legitimacy of the WTO
system-even in the context of a system designed for their benefit.
Finally, they represent a commitment by the wealthier nations to
make the system work by sacrificing some of their riches to enable
the poorer nations to share more evenly in the wealth the system
generates.
But the claim that we can see the emergence of the WTO as a
redistributive organization does not rest solely on the capacity
building provisions of Doha. The rollbacks and concessional
interpretations introduced at Doha-while themselves relatively
modest-can also be interpreted as a redistribution of wealth. This is
true in the sense that the rollbacks and reinterpretations were given
by industrial countries without any corresponding or reciprocal
sacrifices from the developing countries (other than the willingness
to sign on to the new round of negotiations). Once you assume that
the Uruguay Round gave industrial countries the right to insist on
certain obligations-or to press a particular interpretation of the
treaties through dispute resolution-then suspending that obligation
or foregoing that interpretation is a kind of gift-a kind of
redistributive act recognizing that the measure would otherwise have
unacceptable consequences in light of the poverty of the beneficiary
country. 91

91. In addition, the United States may have provided special market access as a
kind of side payment to make the launch of a new round of negotiations attractive.
See Harbaksh Singh Nanda, U.S. to Give $543 Million in GSP to India. Zoellick
Says on Visit to Win WTO Support, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1293 (Aug. 16,
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This is not the first time, of course, that countries gave up their
rights to enforce their obligations under the GATTIWTO system.
That kind of renegotiation of prior commitments is inherent in a rulebased system that must provide flexibility. Yet formally, at least,
those renegotiations of prior commitments are generally
accompanied by compensation for the country that gave up its rights.
A country may give up its rights to insist on a bound tariff, but that
rollback is accompanied (at least in form) by reciprocal
compensation from the country raising its tariff.92 Similarly, an
escape from obligations under the safeguards clause is also supposed
to be accompanied by compensating action.93 In other words, once an
obligation is undertaken, avoiding it is costly. By contrast, the
rollbacks and concessional interpretations at Doha were not costly to
developing countries.
It can always be argued, of course, that a rollback or favorable
interpretation given in order to induce another country to enter trade
negotiations is not truly unilateral, not truly a gift-it is simply the
price of getting to the next level of an integrated global economy. As
I indicated above, the rollbacks and reinterpretations can be depicted
as given in return for the promise of future gains from the new round
of negotiations. Such an interpretation of Doha, while plausible,
would be a dangerous interpretation for the WTO Members to
embrace, however. If we interpret the Doha rollbacks of prior
commitments to establish a new norm of general availability, then
new negotiations would always be hostage to whatever country
wanted to renegotiate prior agreements, and that would open a huge
opportunity for any country to escape prior obligations or reinterpret
prior treaties without cost. It would make the certainty of the prior
negotiations depend solely on the good faith of countries not to

2001) (reporting on a U.S. decision to increase preferences given to India at the
same time that the United States was asking for India's support for a new round of
negotiations at Doha).
92. See GATT, supra note 30, at Annex IA, GATT 1947, art. XXVIII
(explaining how Member countries may modify previously negotiated terms).
93. See id. at Annex IA, art. XIX (explaining the procedures for emergency
withdrawal of negotiated concessions); see also Agreement on Safeguards, supra
note 26, art. 8.1 (stating that Members may agree on the means of trade
compensation).
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invoke the consensus rule-the informal norm that the GATT/WTO
system must get consensus before moving forward.
For that reason, I do not interpret the concessions given to
developing countries that encouraged them to agree to the new
negotiating round to be precedent for a general rule that disappointed
bargainers can renegotiate prior commitments before launching a
new negotiating round. Instead, I see the concessions in
distributional terms. Under this view, the concessions given to
developing countries acknowledged that because of the particular
circumstances of the developing countries-especially poverty-it
was appropriate for the developing countries to give up some of the
gains won during the Uruguay Round.94 This is a redistributive
value.
Doha seems to move the WTO toward distributional values in still
another sense. If the Members carry through on their promise to
negotiate toward balanced outcomes, they will be induced to
continue to make transfer payments in order to make sure the
benefits of the negotiating round are shared equally. 5 As I showed
above, if a commitment to balanced outcomes is a commitment to
proportionally equal outcomes, the negotiation will be severely
constrained unless those who would gain the most in the negotiations
make transfer payments to those who benefit the least.9 6 Without
transfer payments, Members will have difficulty finding bargains
that meet the "balanced outcomes" criteria and also increase total
wealth, for the negotiators will then have to sacrifice some outcomes
that favor one party a great deal but help other parties only a little. 7
With transfer payments, the negotiators can reach outcomes favoring
one side a great deal as long as that side is willing to compensate the

94. See supra Part III.B.1. (explaining the various concessions that the
industrial Members are giving through the Doha negotiations to the developing
countries).
95. See generally IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONS, supra note 2 (explaining the
various ways that the industrial countries will work to negotiate issues that are
beneficial to developing countries).
96. See supra Part III.A. (discussing the point that equal outcomes will

constrain negotiations).
97. See id. (discussing the use of transfer payments to balance the outcomes of
negotiations).
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other side for accepting a deal with relatively little benefit. 9' A
system truly constrained to reach balanced outcomes will naturally
gravitate to transfer payments. 99 In that way, negotiations can
maximize the welfare the system provides while also maximizing the
system's efficiency.1°0

Theory, therefore, tells us that if the balanced outcomes goal is
maintained, we can expect to see more transfer payments from
wealthy to poor countries in order to keep the system moving
forward.' 01 Practical reasoning leads us to the same conclusion.
Institutional dynamics may well induce WTO Members to continue
to experiment with transfer payments as a method of improving the
bargains struck during the negotiations. Doing so will insure the
long-run viability of the WTO enterprise.
Those who look down the road far enough-past Doha, past
Mexico City, and past the successful conclusion of the Doha
Development Round-will see that the endgame in market access
negotiations will present the WTO with a significant institutional
dilemma. Once markets are fully open, and once adequate controls
are in place to remove trade remedies as significant distortions of
trade, WTO Members will have lost the ability to induce other
countries to change their inefficient policies by offering market
access. WTO Members will have exhausted the coin of the realmthe market access that induces foreign governments to change their
conduct-because markets will be open and threats to close them
will be controlled adequately by WTO disciplines. In the absence of
the ability to promise to reduce trade barriers-the carrot and main
engine driving trade negotiations-the possibility of further
negotiations will be exhausted.

98. See id. (explaining that transfer payments can shift benefits from one
contracting party to another in order for both to benefit equally).
99. See id. (explaining that transfer payments may be the only way to equalize
the benefits of negotiations).
100. See id. (explaining that benefits from a contract may benefit one party
greater than the other, and transfer payments from the greater benefiting party to
the less benefiting party can equalize the benefits).
101. See supra Part III.A. (discussing the general use of transfer payments and
the theory that they can equalize benefits of negotiations).
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Yet, clearly, the need for new negotiations will not be exhausted.
The range of issues of international economic integration will
continue to be large. National economic systems will continue to be
diverse, many of them riddled with inefficiencies that create conflicts
with the economies of other countries and opportunities for
improvements in global welfare if the conflicts can be addressed
successfully. A WTO system based only on the barter of market
access opportunities will be unable to address those inefficiencies.
A redistributive WTO opens up a new possibility, however. Recall
that the commitment of wealthy countries to redistribute wealth to
poor countries for capacity building can be viewed in one of two
ways. 10 2 On the one hand, it can be viewed as a straightforward and
good faith commitment to improve the balance in the outcome of the
negotiations. 0 3 Alternatively, we can interpret capacity building as a
bribe-a monetary payment to get the least developed countries to
agree to the negotiations. 1 Under this interpretation, the carrot is not
market access but monetary and monetary-like contributions. That is,
under this interpretation, the WTO Members have already begun to
change the coin of the realm from market access to the direct
redistribution of money.
We can see why this bribe was necessary if we briefly revisit the
Seattle Ministerial.105 The central lesson we must learn from the
Seattle Ministerial is that the United States is running out of market
access promises it can offer to make negotiations attractive to other
countries. True, the United States economy, although open, is far
from friendly to producers in many countries. Restrictive trade
remedy legislation and protection in textile and agricultural sectors
102. See supra Part III.B.l. (highlighting the fact that the industrial nations may
have given concessions to developing countries merely as bait to begin
negotiations, rather than a feeling that the developing countries deserve a sort of

wealth distribution).
103. See id. (giving examples of relaxed provisions for developing countries in
the area of the TRIPs agreement).
104. See id. (stating that the concessions may have the sole purpose of starting a
new round of negotiations).
105. See gene-ally The Seattle Ministerial (explaining the agenda and issues
raised at the Seattle Ministerial meetings as well as links to those issues), available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min99_e/english/about_c/
03bgde.htm.
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continue to thwart the aspirations of many foreign producers to reach
the United States market. But at Seattle, the United States was
blocked from offering anything of value to developing countries. In
the agricultural sector, the United States had nothing to offer Europe
to induce Europe to move the agricultural negotiations forward, so
the United States could not offer developing countries any market
access in agriculture.106 Europe would not budge on agriculture
because any additional market access that the United States offered
Europe was trivial in value; for products of interest to European
companies, formal protection is relatively minor.'" 7 Seattle showed
that the lure of market access was of little value in getting
negotiations started.
Undoubtedly, the failure of Seattle was due in part to the U.S.
position on other matters. The United States was then unwilling to
consider new constraints on the protectionist flexibility offered by
trade remedy legislation, like antidumping and countervailing duty
legislation. 10 8 In light of the demands that the United States was
making for additional commitments with respect to labor rights and
other issues, the offers made by the United States looked miniscule
in terms of the demands made by the United States. But at bottom,
the inability of the United States to make offers of market access that
had any real value made it impossible for developing countries to
agree to a new round. At least under those political circumstances,
the coin of the realm that the United States has traditionally used to
get other countries to the bargaining table-market access-was too
weak for the United States to exert any leadership.
Many things changed between Seattle and Doha. At Doha the
United States was able to get Europe to be more flexible on
agriculture and was able to offer more in other areas.'" And the
United States, following a change in administrations, dropped its
demand with respect to labor rights, which required it to offer less to

106. See id. (giving agricultural statistics).

107. See id. (describing the agricultural issues that the vlembers were to
negotiate at the Seattle Ministerial).
108. See id. (stating the issues to be negotiated).
109. See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, para. 13 (discussing the
negotiations to date on the Agreement on Agriculture).
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get the developing countries to agree to the start the round. "0 But it is
significant that at Doha the United States, and other industrial
countries, also implicitly offered direct payments in order to get the
negotiations started, for those direct payments-although quite
small-demonstrate the power that monetary transfers can have in
inducing countries to consider a change in their policies.
Symbolically, they changed the coin of the WTO realm from market
access to direct payments.
Although only symbolic in its impact, the potential power of this
broadened basis of exchange at the WTO is significant. Direct
transfer payments provide a model under which countries that seek to
bring about costly changes in the regimes and policies of other
countries can pay those countries to make the changes. A country
seeking to induce another country to eliminate a distortionary
economic policy could choose between market access and direct
payment as the carrot to make it attractive for the other country to
change its policy. Say that the United States believed a country's
court process for enforcing intellectual property rights was
ineffective. The United States could direct its aid to that country
toward improving the judicial process in return for a promise to use
the aid to improve the process in specified ways. The United States
could bring about the reform within the context of WTO negotiations
without having to provide greater market access to the other country.
Moves such as this would greatly increase the range of policy
changes that the WTO Members could bring about.
The model is not without its difficulties, but it is also not without
precedent. Foreign aid is already heavily conditional-the aid is
conditioned on the recipient countries agreeing to restrictions on how
the aid is used, and on controls to make sure that the aid meets its
intended goals."1 And the aid is also conditioned on the recipient
countries changing policies that are antithetical to the interests of the

110. See id. (mentioning many issues, but never mentioning any labor standards
negotiations on the agenda, while labor practices were a part of the Seattle planned

negotiations).
I11. See Note by the Secretariat, Participation of Developing Countries in
World Trade: Overview of Major Trends and Underlying Factors, Aug. 16, 1996,
WT/COMTD/W/15 (explaining the use of private foreign aid in capital inflows for
developing countries), at http://www.wto.ort/english/tratop-e/devele/wI 5.htm.
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donor countries.'
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Many

countries

are now

increasing

their

international aid budgets." 3 If WTO Members were to begin to
channel their foreign aid through the WTO they would find that the
ability to make bargains at the WTO increased. They would also be
able to harness the enforcement machinery of the WTO to ensure the
conditions on which the aid was given were in fact being met.

CONCLUSION-THE VISION OF A DISTRIBUTIVE
WTO
I have interpreted the events at Doha to suggest that the WTO
Members may be incorporating distributive values into their work.
This does not suggest that the WTO will lose its character as an
organization that is primarily interested in efficiency. Nor does it
112. The United States, for example, makes preferential market access
conditional on the policies of the country receiving the preferences. This occurs
under the Generalized System of Preferences Act as well as under various regional
preference programs. See Generalized System of Preferences Act, 19 U.S.C.A. §§
2461-2467 (West 1980 & Supp. 1996). See also, e.g., Caribbean Basin Trade
Partnership Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2707 (2000); Andean Trade
Preferences Act, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 3201-3206 (West 1980 & Supp. 1996); African
Growth and Opportunity Act, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 3701-3741 (1980 & Supp. 1996).
See USTR, Press Release, USTR Recommends GSP Suspension of Belarus (July
3, 2000), available at http://-vww.ustr.gov/releases/2000/07/00-5 I.pdf (offering an
example of a withdrawal of this conditional preference because of a violation of
labor rights). A unique aggrement with Cambodia allows higher exports of
garments to the United States when Cambodia ensures that its garment
manufacturers abide with labor standards, including the right to unionize. Wayne
Arnold, Translating Union into Khmer, The A.F.L.-C.I.O. Organizes in Cambodia.
N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2001, at BI (describing program and resulting unionization
efforts); see also USTR, Press Release, USTR Announces Apparel Quota Increase
from Cambodia (May 18, 2000), available at http://wwwv.ustr.gov/
releases/2000/05/00-39.pdf.
113. The United Nations International Conference on Financing for
Devepoment in Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002 stimulated new interest, and
larger appropriations from industrial countries, for international financial aid. See
generally U.N., International Conference on Financing for Development, at
http://www.un.org./esa/ffd/ (last visited May 9, 2002). The efficacy of foreign aid
as a development tool is recounted most recently in WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE
ELUstVE

QUEST

FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS' ADVENTURES AND MISADVENTURES IN

THE TROPICS (2001). See also John Cassidy, Helping Hands, The Case jbr Foreign
Aid, NEW YORKER, Mar. 18, 2002, at 60; Carol Lancaster, Redesigning Foreign Aid,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 74 (2000).
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suggest that the interpretation I give to Doha is irreversible. The
"kindlier gentler" WTO that appears to have emerged at Doha is but
a small step-some would say too small-and it will not make the
bargaining during the Doha Development Round less self-centered or
hard-edged. Moreover, an organization like the WTO, which is built
on self-interested exchange, can pursue redistributive goals in only a
limited fashion. Because the WTO system was developed as an
exchange of market opening opportunities, the gains from the WTO
process are limited to gains that can come through the exchange
process, and those gains are primarily related to increased wealth.
Because there is no internal control on the bargaining mechanism,
and no external monitor to evaluate the fairness of the exchange, it is
difficult to get redistributive or fairness gains from an exchange
system. Exchange generally involves a positive sum game, while
redistribution involves a zero sum game.
Nonetheless, my reading of the Doha tea leaves suggests how one
might think the WTO system is transforming into one that advances
distributive values as well as efficiency values. At the core of that
transformation would be the recognition of the public goods aspects
of international prosperity and relative equality. Equality has a value
for the global economic system that benefits all countries, even those
who must sacrifice some wealth to bring about the equality. At a
minimum, Doha recognized in principle that equality in bargaining
capacity is important to the future of the WTO regime, and the
Members took steps to improve the bargaining capacity of poorer
countries. More broadly, Doha may be interpreted to recognize that
relative equality provides stability and acceptability that will enhance
both the legitimacy and stability of global governance. International
social stability provides the synergy that keeps the system of rulebased, neutral economic growth intact. This value cannot be
achieved simply by asking each country to follow its own selfinterest, for, as in the case of other public goods, individual
investment yields too little. The kind of relative equality that will
give some stability to the international economic system can be
reached only if self-interest is tempered by joint interest, and if WTO
bargaining is therefore done so that the benefits are not only
reciprocal but also balanced. Any mechanism that the WTO can put
in place to improve the balance in the bargaining between nations
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and the "fairness" of the outcomes will surely catch the spirit of the
distributional goals I derived from Doha.
At bottom, my interpretation of Doha is built on the notion that, at
Doha, industrial countries recognized-at least implicitly-that they
may temper what they could get in the short run in order to get what
is surely in their long term self-interest-a global system in which
the interests of the system-the interests of the community of
nations-transcend the interests of individual nations. As selfinterest in the success of the system replaces self-interest in what can
be gained from the system, industrial countries will naturally come to
embrace distributive values as they seek to guide the growth of the
WTO.
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